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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
from the
verdict finding him guilty of lewd conduct.

entered

ju

Berber contends the district court

erred in allowing the admission of I.RE. 404(b) evidence.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Berber had sexual intercourse with his girlfriend's 1 daughter, N M., on
several occasions. (See generally Tr., pp.316-343.) The abuse occurred while
N.M. was 12- and 13-years old and started around New Year's Eve in 2008 when
NM. lived in Caldwell, Idaho, with her mom, Berber, and her siblings.
p.316, L.13

(Tr.,

p.326, L.18.) The abuse continued when the family moved from

Caldwell to California and ended when N.M.'s dad went to California in
November 2009 to pick N.M. up and move her back to Idaho. (Tr., p.338, L.12 p.347, L.5, p.464, Ls.20-24.) N.M. had not yet disclosed the abuse at that time;
she eventually disclosed in July 2010 when she confided in her stepsister, K.
(Tr., p.304, L.4, p.350, Ls.2-15, p.520, Ls.22-24.) The disclosure came after a
custody battle between N.M.'s parents in which N.M.'s father was awarded
custody. (Tr., p.465, Ls.5-9, p.519, L.24 -p.521, L.2.) The abuse allegations,
however, were not a component of the court's custody determination.

(Tr.,

p.392, Ls.13-21, p.465, Ls.10-14.)

1

At the time of the abuse, Berber was N.M.'s mother's boyfriend; they later
married on "11-11-11." (Tr., p.555, Ls.1-2.)
1

After N.M. disclosed to her stepsister. the information was communicated
to her father and to her mother who contacted !aw enforcement.

(Tr., p.355,

L.14 - p.356, L.7.) During the subsequent investigation, N.M. was interviewed at
CARES.

(Tr., p.263, Ls.2-6.)

The examination conducted as part of that

interview revealed N.M. had a "deep notch" in her hymen, which is indicative of
"bl un t ",orce p~nc.ra11ng
A
~t •;
t.rauma. " (T. r., p. 2~7
b , L . 19
.

-

p. 268 , L .2)
. At' th e t'1me of

the CARES interview, N.M. also disclosed that, subsequent to the abuse
perpetrated by Berber, she was abused by another individual, Octavio Garcia,
after she returned to Idaho with her father in 2009. (Tr., p.272, Ls.2-3, p.350,
L.19 - p.352, L.31.) Garcia was charged with and pied guilty to lewd conduct for
that offense. (Tr., p.396, Ls.19-24; Exhibit 3.)
A grand jury indicted Berber on one count of lewd conduct. (R., pp.8-9.)
The Indictment specifically charged Berber with "having manual to genital and/or
genital to genital" content with N. M. "on or between March 26, 2009 and
November 30, 2009" in Canyon County.

(R., pp.8-9.) At trial, however, N.M.

was permitted to testify about additional acts of abuse dating back to the initial
offense and including acts of oral to genital and anal to genital contact

(See

generally, Tr., pp.316-343.)
The jury found Berber guilty as charged. (R., p.188.) The court imposed
a unified 20-year sentence with six and one-half years fixed. (R., pp.210-211.)
Berber filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.212-213.)

2

ISSUE

states

on appeal as:

Did the district court err when it permitted the presentation of
irrelevant propensity evidence in violation of Rule 404(b), and
abuse its discretion when it admitted the other bad acts evidence
without conducting the requisite balancing test?
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Berber failed to show error in the district court's I.R.

3

404(b) ruling?

ARGUMENT
Berber Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's LRE. 404(b) Ruling
A.

Introduction
Berber challenges the district court's ruling allowing N.M. to testify about

uncharged acts of lewd conduct. Specifically, Berber contends "the district court
erred when, over his objection, it concluded that other bad acts evidence was not
propensity evidence and was relevant under Rule 404(b )" and "when it admitted
the evidence after refusing to conduct the requisite balancing test." (Appellant's
Brief, pp.5-6.) Berber's arguments fail. The district court correctly concluded the
evidence was admissible and, contrary to Berber's claim on appeal, the district
court conducted the required balancing test under I.RE. 403.

Berber has,

therefore, failed to show error in the district court's I.RE. 404(b) ruling. Even if
Berber had met his burden of showing error, any error is harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard:

whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d
1185, 1187 (2009).
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C.

Berber Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's I.R.E. 404(b)
Ruling
1.

The Uncharged Acts Admitted At Trial Were Relevant
to trial, the state gave notice of its intent to introduce evidence,

pursuant to I.R.

404(b).

(R, pp.60-61.)

The notice indicated the state

intended to introduce evidence that Berber "had on-going sexual contact with
N.M. during the time period from on or around December 31, 2008 to November
30, 2009; and these on-going sexual acts happened both in Idaho and
California." (R., p.61.) The notice also described the sexual contact as including
"genital to genital contact, oral to genital contact, and genital to anal contact."
(R., p.61.) The court allowed the presentation of such evidence.
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a
defendant's criminal propensity. However, such evidence may be admissible for
a purpose other than that prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b)." State v. Truman, 150
Idaho 714, 249 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted).
purposes include proof of motive, opportunity,

intent,

Other proper

preparation,

plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 1.R.E. 404(b); State v.
Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83,
87, 785 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989). As long as the evidence is relevant to
prove some issue other than the defendant's character and its probative value
for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair
prejudice, it is not error to admit it. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d
227, 230 (1999). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence if the
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danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State v.
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65 (2003).
On appeal, Berber argues that the district court erred by admitting the
proffered I.R.E. 404(b) evidence because, he claims, "none of the exceptions in
Rule 404(b) apply to render the other bad act evidence relevant and admissible."
(Appellant's Brief, p. 7.) Berber is incorrect.
Berber's prolonged and repeated abuse of N.M. was relevant for several
reasons. First, pursuant to LR.E. 404(b), evidence of prior wrongs or acts may
be admitted when relevant to show the defendant's intent and/or plan to commit
the charged offense. LR.E. 404(b); State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, 254 P.3d
47, 53 (Ct. App. 2011). In sex abuse cases, evidence that the defendant has
engaged in other uncharged acts of sexual misconduct with the victim is
"relevant to demonstrate the young victim's credibility."

State v. Scovell, 136

Idaho 587, 590, 38 P.3d 625, 628 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Tolman, 121
Idaho 899, 904, 828 P.2d 1304, 1309 (1992), and State v. Moore, 120 Idaho
743, 745-46, 819 P.2d 1143, 1145-46 (1991). 2 Such evidence "may render the
jury 'better able to compare patterns and methods, details and generalities,
consistencies and discrepancies, and thereby [make] a more meaningful and

2

The state recognizes that Scovell, which relied, in part, on Moore, predates
Grist and the Idaho Supreme Court's limitation on Moore. However, the Idaho
Supreme Court did "not overrule Moore in its entirety." Grist, 147 Idaho at 54,
205 P.3d at 1190. Importantly, the Court reaffirmed that "Moore correctly states:
'Where relevant to the credibility of the parties, evidence of a common criminal
design is admissible."' kl Consistent with this recognition, since Grist, the Idaho
Court of Appeals has cited Scovell with approval. Gomez, 151 Idaho at 153 n.3,
254 P.3d at 54 n.3.
6

accurate assessment of the parties credibility."' Scovell, 136 Idaho at 590, 38
P.3d at 628 (quoting Tolman, 121 Idaho at 905, 828 P.2d at 1310 (alteration
original).

In

is case, N.M.'s "testimony about when and how the abusive

behavior began allowed the jury to see the full picture, putting her testimony
about the charged acts into context." Scovell, 136 Idaho at 590, 38 P.3d at 628.
"The challenged testimony gave the jury a better ability to assess whether [N.M.]
was fabricating her story or telling the truth."
was relevant to [N.M.'s] credibility."

kL.

"Therefore, ... the evidence

kL.

Second, and not withstanding Berber's claim to the contrary, identity was
an issue in this case.

(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) There was evidence presented

that N.M. was abused by a second man who pied guilty to the offense. Berber
argued the hymen injury noted by the CARES nurse could have been caused by
Garcia rather than Berber.

(Tr., p.611, L.22 - p.612, L.13 ) However, N.M.

testified that Berber's long-term abuse preceded the offense committed by
Garcia (Tr., p.352, Ls.4-18), and the charge to which Garcia pied alleged the
offense was committed in June 2010 (Exhibit 3).
Berber also placed identity at issue by presenting evidence that he had a
tattoo on his penis, which N.M. did not notice - a point that is hardly surprising
given the nature of the tattoo, which appears faded and indecipherable as
anything in particular and could be misjudged as some sort of natural circulatory
discoloration, especially by a young child.

Moreover, Berber's reliance on his

tattoo to establish he was not the one who abused N.M. presupposes she
actually looked at his penis. Unsurprisingly, N.M. testified that she did not pay
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particular attention to Berber's penis and, in fact, closed her eyes when Berber
put his penis in her mouth. (Tr., p.394, Ls.14-23.)

N.M.'s ability to explain the

scope of her abuse by Berber was relevant to rebut Berber's claim that he was
not the one who abused N.M.
Third, the 404(b) evidence was relevant to show opportunity, which was
another key aspect of Berber's defense. Berber called N.M.'s mom as a witness
and she testified that Berber had no opportunity to abuse N.M. because, she
claimed, they were "together all the time" and "[t]here was not one time that it
could happen."

Berber also called N.M.'s grandmother,

(Tr., p.517, Ls.8-9.)

Patricia, as a witness. With respect to the first incident of abuse on New Year's
Eve about which N.M. testified, Patricia claimed N.M. was at her house.

(Tr.,

p.494, L.21 - p.496, L.19.) N.M.'s mom corroborated this testimony. (Tr., p.509,
L.24 - p.512, L.8.) Evidence that the abuse occurred on multiple occasions and
the circumstances under which it occurred was relevant to show opportunity.
Berber has failed to show the uncharged sexual acts he perpetrated on
N.M. were not relevant.

2.

The Probative Value Of The Challenged Evidence Was Not
Substantially Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice

Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the
district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice -- which is the tendency
to suggest a decision on an improper basis -- substantially outweighs the
probative value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 4 71, 248 P.3d
720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct.
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App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App.
1993). As previously explained by the Idaho Supreme Court:
Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The
rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant
evidence.
State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990)
(emphasis in original).
Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely
prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to a party's case.

See State v.

Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) ("Certainly that evidence
was prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial
is demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in
prejudice to a defendant."). Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that
is unfairly prejudicial, that is, evidence that tends to suggest a decision on an
improper basis. Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908.
Berber claims "the district court abused its discretion when it affirmatively
refused to conduct the requisite balancing test under Rule 403."
Brief, p.12.)

(Appellant's

In support of this argument, Berber relies on the following

statements by the district court:
And the third prong that I've - that I'm going to make
reference to, although I've impliedly done so, is where the probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
And that is not a factor here, because it's -- it's the same
individuals. And I think the testimony is going to be something that
either is given -- I mean, either the jury will either find that credible
or they won't find it credible.
(Appellant's Brief, p.12 (quoting Tr., p.226, Ls.5-13) (emphasis by Berber).)
Berber interprets the italicized language as the district court creating a
Rule 403 "exception for conduct involving the same parties." (Appellant's Brief,
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p.12.) Berber's interpretation of the court's comments, particularly when read in
context, is unwarranted. Most notably, the court prefaced its comments with the
recitation of the applicable legal standard. (Tr., p.226, Ls.5-8.) The court did not
impose its own exception to that standard by stating "that is not a factor here." 3
(Tr., p.226, Ls.8-9.)

The court's reference to it not being "a factor" is the

equivalent of stating the probative value of the evidence was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

The court's rationale for that

conclusion appears to be based on the fact that, unlike 404(b) issues that involve
sexual abuse of other victims, which arguably have a greater potential for
prejudice, in this case the uncharged acts involved the same victim. Because
the question for the jury would be one of credibility, the probative value of the
evidence was high (for the reasons discussed above in relation to why the
evidence was relevant) as compared to the minimal prejudicial value associated
with evidence of multiple acts of abuse. The fact that Berber abused N.M. at all
was prejudicial. Any additional prejudice related to his act of doing it more than
once did not substantially outweigh the probative value.
Berber has failed to establish that the district court either failed to conduct
the weighing required by LR. E. 403 or abused its discretion by admitting the
uncharged acts of abuse.

3

It is also worth noting that Berber did not object to the district court's application
of the legal standard; to the extent he believed the court was creating an
exception to I.R.E. 403, he should have raised the issue below rather than
attempt to interpret the language employed, for the first time on appeal, in a
manner he deems favorable to his claim.
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D.

Even If Berber Has Met His Burden Of Showing Evidentiary Error. Any
Such Error Is Harmless
Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or

variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R.
52. 'The inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would
have convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the challenged
evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010)
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1 18 (1999)); see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d
961, 979 (2010).
Even if the district court erred in permitting the introduction of the state's
proffered I.RE 404(b), such error is harmless. It is unlikely the jury would have
found N.M.'s testimony any less compelling had it been limited to the two single
acts of abuse alleged in the Indictment - genital to genital or manual to genital.
Further, N.M.'s testimony was corroborated by the CARES nurse, Alisa Ortega.
Ortega not only testified about N.M.'s hymen injury but also testified, without
objection, that, based on the information N.M. provided "as well as her physical
examination, it was [her] conclusion that [N.M.] had been sexually abused." (Tr.,
p.271, Ls.16-22.)

The jury apparently found Ortega's testimony significant as

evidenced by a note it sent during deliberations, which reads: "We would like to
hear part of Alisa Ortega's testimony.

We wish to focus on her meeting with

N.M." (R., p.187.)

In addition, the court gave both a limiting instruction in relation to the
404(b) evidence (R., p.172) and a unanimity instruction such that the jury was

11

required the jury to "unanimously agree which act or incident satisfies a!I the
elements of the crime charged" (R., p.171).
Given the evidence presented, along with the iim1ting instructions, this
Court can conclude any error in admission of the I.RE. 404(b) evidence was
harmless.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdict finding Berber guilty of lewd conduct.
th

DATED this 6 day of December 2013.

JESSIGA M. LORELLO
Deputy'Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
th

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6 day of December 2013, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
SPENCERJ.HAHN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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